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Abstract: Web 2.0, social media, cloud computing, and IoT easily connect people around the globe, 
overcoming time and space barriers, and offering manifold benefits. However, the technological 
advances and increased user participation generate novel challenges for protecting users’ privacy. 
From the user perspective, data disclosure depends, in part, on the perceived sensitivity of that data, 
and thus on a risk assessment of data disclosure.  But in light of the new technological opportunities 
to process and combine data, it is questionable whether users are able to adequately evaluate the 
risks of data disclosures. As mediating authority, data protection laws try to protect user data, granting 
enhanced protection to “special categories” of data. In this publication, the legal, technological, and 
user perspectives on data sensitivity are presented and compared. From a technological perspective, 
all data can be referred to as “potentially sensitive.” The legal and user perspective on data sensitivity 
deviate as some data types are granted special protection by the law but are not perceived as very 
sensitive by the users, and vice versa. Merging the three perspectives, the implications for 
informational self-determination are discussed. 
Keywords: Information Sensitivity, Privacy, European Data Protection Law, User Perspective. 
  
I. Introduction 
 
The early 2000's shift of online services towards the Web 2.0 paradigm1 constituted a revolution 
of online services: user participation became an elementary ingredient of modern online services to 
enable, e.g., more direct forms of communication or provide personalized and thus improved services 
to their users. More and more technologies that offer convenience, entertainment, and support for 
users in almost all areas of life evoke that a large proportion of everyday life of typical internet users 
takes place using online services. For that and thereby, users generate and disclose large amounts of 
data.  
But users are not always content with that: many users are concerned about their online privacy 
and data collection2. Nevertheless, the so-called privacy paradox describes the phenomenon that 
users still disclose much personal data despite their stated concerns3. They often feel forced to 
disclose more data than they actually would like to4 and are at the same time unsure about their rights 
and privacy protection possibilities5. For example, 58% of Europeans incorrectly believe that chat 
messages are confidential by law.6 
Users concerns and paradoxical sharing behavior encounters developing technological 
possibilities. Data collection and processing has evolved over time so that increasingly more 
information can be combined, deanonymized, and used to profile individuals. For example, the recent 
Cambridge Analytica scandal showed how this user data and user profiles can even be used to 
influence democratic elections. And the data used by Cambridge Analytica was voluntarily disclosed 
by the users. Here, the question arises again, why users disclose data when they are concurrently 
worried about its use? Many aspects have been considered to explain privacy paradoxical behaviors, 
e.g., missing awareness or knowledge, convenience and benefits for data disclosure that override 
perceived risks, or heuristics and cognitive limitations that influence decision behaviors.7 One central 
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aspect is that users evaluate the risks of data disclosure and that this evaluation is biased. How risky 
data disclosure is perceived, and correspondingly, how willingly it is disclosed, is strongly influenced 
by the type of data at stake -- and its perceived sensitivity.8 But in light of the new technological 
possibilities that introduce increasing potential to data use, this sensitivity evaluation may not be up-
to-date.  
Undoubtedly, there are, nonetheless, many occasions in which the disclosure and processing of 
personal data is indicated and necessary. E.g., if an e-commerce company is to sell articles, they have 
to obtain an address where to ship to and also receive payment, therefore having to gain access to 
bank data and charge the wares worth. Also, many digital services are offered without charge in 
exchange for the user data. In these situations, a reasonable and responsible handling of user data is 
necessary to most online services and transactions. As a mediating authority between the commercial 
demand and the privacy concerns, there are laws that govern the use of user data by companies. In 
Europe, data protection is for the most part regulated by the new European General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR), which distinguishes between different categories of information that are granted 
different levels of protection. The GDPR concerns only personal data that is defined as information 
relating to an identified or identifiable natural person. It also knows special categories of personal 
data embracing particularly sensitive information about natural persons. But with the ever-improving 
potential for data analysis the question arises whether the regulation (legal perspective) captures 
what can potentially become sensitive (technological perspective) and also what users perceive to be 
sensitive data (user perspective).  
The aim of the GDPR is to strengthen the right to informational self-determination, thus 
guaranteeing a save environment in which users can decide freely what services to use and what data 
to share. In this paper, we will examine sensitivity of information from the three perspectives, legal, 
technological, and user, and compare these perspectives. We will begin with providing an overview of 
how data collection and processing by online services has evolved over time and how new 
technologies redefine what must be considered potentially sensitive data. For the legal perspective, 
we discuss how the GDPR distinguishes between different categories of data and what protection it 
grants these. To contribute a user perspective on information privacy, n = 601 German internet users 
evaluated the perceived sensitivity of 40 different data types in an online questionnaire. This data 
forms the basis of a comparison between the three perspectives and a discussion of the findings. 
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II. Information Sensitivity from a Technological Perspective 
We begin our discussion by reenacting how user interaction on the Internet evolved over time, 
how this development yielded new opportunities as well as severe privacy risks, and how technology 
aims to overcome these challenges. This discussion subsequently serves as a foundation to assess the 
users' and legal perspective on (perceived) data sensitivity. We sketch how paradigm shifts promoted 
higher degrees of user interaction and sharing of data and how recent technologies support this trend. 
We then complement these observations with a discussion of privacy challenges stemming from 
the technological development, where we conclude that previously uncritical data can potentially 
become highly sensitive given technological advances and that single technical countermeasures 
cannot mitigate all arising risks. 
1. Evolving User Interaction on the Internet 
 
The early 2000's shift of online services towards the Web 2.0 paradigm9 constituted a revolution 
of online services: user participation became an elementary ingredient of modern online services to 
enable, e.g., more direct forms of communication or provide personalized and thus improved services 
to their users. Prominent examples of classical Web 2.0 services comprise knowledge databases such 
as Wikipedia, media sharing platforms such as YouTube, Flickr, or SoundCloud, and personal blogs as 
a user-friendly evolution of personal homepages.10 However, also the utilization of user statistics, e.g., 
their search queries or surfing behavior, became more important once user participation was shifted 
to the center of attention as they allow optimizing the user experience.11 
The level of user interaction culminated in the rise of social networks such as Twitter and 
Facebook, which brings users and companies closer together in a highly interactive manner: users can 
create links to their friends and relatives and publicly or privately share memorable moments or 
opinions in text, picture, video, or by sharing or commenting other users' posts. In consequence, social 
networks still remain popular today, as is expressed by Facebook's 2.3 billion and Twitter's 335 million 
monthly active users, respectively.12 
This rise of such global platforms was enabled by shifting to the cloud computing paradigm13, 
which enabled service providers to rapidly tailor computing resources to their individual needs with a 
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drastically lowered need for technical expertise. However, users did not only implicitly benefit from 
the cloud via its increased scalability and lowered entry barrier for service providers. The cloud's 
ubiquity also enabled users to outsource their data to the cloud in order to simplify sharing data or 
maintaining online backups, as showcased by the popular services provided by, e.g., Dropbox, Google 
Drive, or Amazon Drive. 
Ultimately, the advent of smartphones and the Internet of Things (IoT), e.g., in the form of fitness 
trackers or smart home devices, would have been unthinkable without the cloud. On the one hand, 
cloud storage enabled online services to synchronize different devices of users very easily. Hence, 
users can now access their relevant data on both their smartphones and their notebooks or desktop 
PCs with minimal management overhead. On the other hand, the cloud's scalable processing power 
enables service providers to remotely process the data sensed by their users' IoT devices, which are 
typically resource-constrained and thus unable to perform costly computations. 14  However, the 
inherent centrality of the cloud is also source of user reservations as we detail in the next section. 
As a consequence, systems based on distributed ledgers, most notably blockchains, recently 
gained traction to break up this level of centralization: while initial blockchain-based systems such as 
Bitcoin 15  or Ethereum 16  focused on achieving trustless distributed financial services, distributed 
ledgers are now being explored to be used for, e.g., tamper-proof file storage17 or access control 
management of user data,18 i.e., services concerning data that is currently being hosted on the cloud. 
Distributed ledgers are experiencing this popularity because their immutability establishes technical 
accountability among otherwise mutually distrusting parties. 
In conclusion, new technologies always simplified the deployment of online services centered 
around user participation or even enabled novel services over the Internet. However, those 
opportunities do not come without additional challenges, which we discuss in the subsequent section. 
2. Increasing Data Sensitivity 
In the preceding section, we sketched how the Web 2.0 encouraged all users to participate in the 
content creation, yielding novel Internet services such as social media. Technological advances such 
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as cloud computing, smartphones, wearables and smart home raised the shareability and availability 
of user data on the Internet to new dimensions. Furthermore, recent advances such as distributed 
ledgers are currently being explored as a potential next step in this vein. In this section, we argue that 
all these technological advances come with novel challenges for protecting users' privacy. Most 
notably, they can cause new types of user data to become sensitive either due to new kinds of data 
being exposed online or due to advanced analysis capabilities deriving new insights from the available 
data. Hence, it is thus more appropriate to refer to all user data on the Internet as potentially sensitive 
data as we discuss in the following: 
Web2.0. The shift towards centering around user participation within the Web 2.0 paradigm 
inherently led to the collection of more user data. This is problematic with respect to insights gained 
from service personalization, user tracking, and data breaches. Online services are routinely 
personalized to increase the user experience, e.g., provide individually better search results. While 
personalized services can benefit the user, the collected data is potentially highly sensitive. For 
instance, in 2006 AOL infamously released users' search queries from their search engine for research 
purposes. However, only the user identifiers were anonymized, and the search queries were left 
untouched. Journalists were thus able to easily deanonymize users solely based on their query 
history.19 It is further possible via more advanced analysis methods to disclose sensitive user data even 
from properly anonymized data sets. For example, in 2006 Netflix released a data set of anonymous 
movie ratings, which could be disclosed by correlating the anonymized data with movie ratings from 
IMDb even for small overlaps of rated movies in both data sets.20 The authors claim that this, for 
instance, can potentially reveal additional latent attributes of the users such as their political views.21 
Web tracking maximizes this form of data collection by monitoring users' browsing behavior across 
services. 22  Knowing the set of visited websites or even, for instance, individual online articles, 
potentially discloses a much more fine-grained view on users compared to their behavior interacting 
with a single service. Furthermore, web tracking is oftentimes technically opaque to the user, which 
is why today legislation begins to counter such practices, e.g., the European GDPR now mandates 
service operators to inform users about their utilization of tracking cookies. Yet, even privacy-aware 
users actively protecting their privacy by deleting cookies or using private browsing have been shown 
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to be susceptible to web tracking due to their distinct behavior.23 While service personalization and 
web tracking disclose sensitive user data explicitly or implicitly to the respective service operators, a 
major threat also lies in the potential for data breaches. Such breaches typically release login 
credentials and other meta data for users' accounts registered with the attacked platform. At the time 
of writing, the website ``Have I Been Pwned?'' which enables users to check whether or not their 
credentials were affected by a certain data breach, lists 324 of such breaches, affecting 5.5 billion 
records in total.24 
Social Media. Especially the rise of social media revolutionized users' online behavior as they 
allowed them to rapidly share personal moments and thoughts with both their friends and a general 
audience. However, this new-found freedom also came along with unprecedented privacy issues due 
to sensitive data disclosure. On the one hand, users can directly share clearly sensitive data with the 
public. For instance, some users posted private credit card information on Twitter, which were 
collected by one Twitter account in the past. 25  On the other hand, users can release sensitive 
information via meta data such as GPS locations stored in uploaded pictures.26 Social networks can 
aggravate the consequences of such disclosures in cases when users disclose information of another 
user or when a user is unaware of their (effective) privacy settings.27 These incidents showcase the 
need for users to be educated about potential threats arising from sharing sensitive data on the 
Internet and that users must carefully gauge which data to share and which not to share. Hence, the 
manifold opportunities of expressing themselves via social media mandates that users educate 
themselves about technical implications and potential consequences of using corresponding services, 
ultimately gauge carefully which data to share and which not to share. Furthermore, the data users 
share online can be combined and subsequently collectively be exploited as shown by the Cambridge 
Analytica scandal.28 It was reported that Cambridge Analytica obtained profile data of 30 million 
Facebook users without their consent from which they were able to create psychographic profiles, 
e.g., by incorporating other data sources and matching that data to the Facebook users.29 This enabled 
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the corporation to derive sensitive attributes such as political views, life satisfaction, or religious 
beliefs from the collected data and subsequently use it to steer affected users via targeted 
advertisements.30 Hence, users can be profiled based on their shared data and the increased potential 
stemming from new analysis methods to exploit such data can cause such data to effectively become 
sensitive.  
Cloud Computing. Users outsourcing data to the cloud can cause a perceived loss of control over 
their data. On the one hand, due to the cloud's multitenancy, single cloud providers could gain access 
to user data of all customers.31 This is especially highlighted by the high prevalence of cloud services 
being used to fuel, e.g., smartphone applications32 or email services,33 which may be opaque to the 
user. On the other hand, computing clouds can be distributed over multiple data centers. In this case, 
users lose control over where their data is being stored, which can violate both private and even legal 
requirements.34 Hence, the increased technical complexity of data management must be addressed 
in order to enable users to make educated decisions about outsourcing potentially sensitive data to 
online services. 
Smartphones and IoT. The ubiquity of sensing devices such as smartphones or IoT devices, 
including wearables such as fitness trackers, create new challenges for user privacy.35 To a large 
extent, this stems from the fact that third parties can potentially extract very fine-grained information 
from a user's sensor data using appropriate analysis technologies. While, for instance, traditional 
location-based services (e.g., on a user's smartphone) only report single locations, other services 
process whole trajectories,36 e.g., GPS tracks generated by a user's fitness tracker, which often allows 
for a much more fine-grained tracking of users. Furthermore, the often-insufficient security of IoT 
devices for smart homes can potentially leak sensitive information directly from the user's house to 
the Internet.37 This potential threat is further exemplified by recent advances in deep learning.38 For 
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example, China is now technically able to track citizens in public spaces via a large network of 
governmental IoT devices, which is used to denounce, e.g., speeders publicly.39  In conclusion, in 
addition to potentially having her data being exposed to third parties without being in control, the 
user must also consider the potentials of involved analyses of her sensed data to reveal additional 
sensitive information about her. This especially holds for the envisioned paradigm of data markets,40 
where users could actively sell sensor data to interested analysts. 
Distributed Ledgers. A potential shift towards distributed ledger-based online service also 
increases the potential sensitivity of data due to the ledgers' often public nature and their 
immutability by design. While privacy-preserving platforms based on distributed ledgers are being 
explored that aim to mitigate public data disclosure41 sensitive data on the blockchain can have 
especially devastating consequences. On the one hand, the initial promise of blockchains to provide 
financial privacy has been falsified by multiple works concerning user anonymity in Bitcoin.42 On the 
other hand, it has been shown that arbitrary data can be stored directly on blockchains.43 This can 
have serious privacy issues as users tend to store memorable private moments on the blockchain, 
culminating in reported incidents of doxing on the Bitcoin blockchain, i.e., the malicious and in this 
case irrevocable disclosure of sensitive data of another user.44 These initial observations with respect 
to the emerging distributed ledger technology indicate that users once again will be facing increasing 
complexity in the technologies fueling their online services in the future. 
In conclusion, emerging new technologies can cause intuitively non-sensitive data to become 
sensitive due to the potential unwanted impact seizing this data can have. Despite whole research 
areas being dedicated to protect sensitive data from being disclosed to unauthorized parties, there is 
no general solution to technical data protection. This is exemplified by the fact that today's privacy-
enhancing technologies such as secure multiparty computation are typically heavily tailored to only a 
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class of problems.45 We expect this effect to be further accelerated in the future as widespread 
technologies become more complex and diverse, and thus harder for users to keep track of in order 
to gauge potential privacy threats, as we discuss in the subsequent section. 
III. Information Sensitivity from a Legal Perspective 
Since May 2018 the data protection law in the member states of the European Union is almost 
exclusively determined by the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), leaving only a 
very limited scope of application to distinct national data protection legislation.46 Depending on the 
content of the data, the European data protection law distinguishes between three different 
categories: personal, special categories of personal, and non-personal data, which are granted 
different levels of protection. 
Art. 4 No. 1 GDPR defines personal data as any information relating to an identified or identifiable 
natural person. Special categories of personal data consist of personal data referring to particularly 
sensitive information concerning a natural person. Under Art. 9 sec. 1 GDPR these include data 
revealing a person’s racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs or union 
membership. Furthermore, genetic, biometric and health data as well as data concerning a person’s 
sex life or sexual orientation are part of this category. Every piece of information not coming under 
the definition of personal data, however, has to be considered non-personal data under data 
protection law [cf. Art. 3 No. 1 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on a framework for the free flow of non-personal data in the European Union, COM (2017) 495 final]. 
The level of protection of these different types of data varies widely. The protection of natural 
persons’ personal data in relation to processing is a fundamental right under Artt. 7, 8 of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union as well as under national laws and constitutions of the 
member states, e.g., Art. 2 sec. 1 icw. Art. 1 sec. 1 GG. European and national Data protection law, 
therefore, provide various provisions to ensure this protection. Elementary to this concept is the 
principle of “ban with reservation of permit,” which is laid down in Art. 6 sec. 1 cl. 1 GDPR.47 It, only, 
allows data processing, if a law provides a legal basis for it. 48  The processing of personal data, 
furthermore, has to be conducted lawfully, transparently, and fairly (Art. 5 sec. 1 lit. a) GDPR). It is 
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limited to a particular and determined purpose and the amount of data necessary for this (Art. 5 sec. 
1 lit. b), c) GDPR). The data processed has to be accurate and may only be stored for the limited 
amount of time necessary for the purpose of the processing (Art. 5 sec. 1 lit. d), e) GDPR). At last, the 
processing has to ensure the integrity and confidentiality of the data (Artt. 5 sec. 1 lit. f), 32 GDPR). 
Further general duties of the data processors consist of ensuring data protection by the design of their 
products and its defaults (Art. 25 GDPR) as well as the conduction of a data protection impact 
assessment concerning their processing. The data protection law, moreover, grants data subjects 
several rights against the data processors. They hold the rights to transparent information about the 
data processing (Artt. 12 - 14 GDPR), the right to access information concerning the data stored about 
them (Art. 15 GDPR), the right to rectify wrong data stored (Art. 16 GDPR), and the right to erase data 
or restrict the further use of data (Artt. 17, 18 GDPR). All these rights and obligations are combined 
with efficient legal enforcement mechanisms, creating a high level of protection for personal data. 
The group of personal data summarized under the notion of “special categories” consists of types 
of personal data which can be described as sensitive personal attributes. They have in common that 
they concern very personal beliefs or states which bear a special risk of being a leverage point for 
discrimination49 and are closely connected to the exercise of fundamental rights.50 The processing of 
this data can result in a severe violation of person’s privacy as well as significant risks to the 
fundamental rights and freedoms.51 The legal protection for special categories of personal, therefore, 
has to be even stronger compared to common personal data. Following the principle of “ban with 
reservation to permit”,52 Art. 9 GDPR restricts the processing of special categories of personal data to 
less, more specific and more essential situations. Furthermore, only under very strict conditions 
personal data of the special categories may, at all, be used for decision making based solely on 
automated processing, including profiling (Art. 22 GDPR). If special categories of personal data are 
processed, this always leads to the necessity for the processor to keep records of his processing 
activities (Art. 30 GDPR). If handling this kind of data in a larger scale, the processor has to conduct 
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data protection impact assessment (Art. 35 sec. 3 lit. b) GDPR) and is obliged to appoint a data 
protection officer (Art. 37 sec. 1 lit. c) GDPR).  
As non-personal data does not fall under the scope of the fundamental rights which establish data 
protection, it is, hence, neither protected under the GDPR nor national data protection laws. Non-
personal data, however, may be protected by other laws under different legal means, e.g., business 
secrets which are protected by the national civil law.53 
The GDPR as well as the national data protection legislations differentiate between data 
protection and data security. While data protection aims at the defense of personal data against the 
dangers of their processing54, data security embraces all measures to preserve data from misuse and 
interference of risks from outside of the process of processing.55 A legal use of a personal data always 
requires adequate safety and security measures. An appropriate security level considers the technical 
state-of-the-art, the costs of the implementation of the security measures, the probability of 
occurrence of security risks, nature, scope, context and purposes of the processing as well as the risks 
for the rights and freedoms of the natural persons which might especially arise from the accidental or 
unlawful destruction, loss or unauthorized disclosure.56 The processing of particular sensitive data 
may, hence, only lead to more data security, while in reverse the processing of common personal data 
does not mean to the absence of security measures. 
IV. Information Sensitivity from a User Perspective 
From the user perspective, the perception of how sensitive an information is influences whether 
users feel their privacy to be preserved and thus, how concerned they are about said data provision 
or access. Information privacy can be defined as “the claim of individuals, groups or institutions to 
determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated 
to others.” 57   Research has shown that users are more concerned and less willing to provide 
information when it is perceived as highly sensitive.58 For example, medical information is felt to be 
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sensitive,59 especially information about psychological health.60 Markos and colleagues61 found that 
for US Americans the social security number is the most sensitive, whereas information about number 
of children, height, and race are perceived as the least sensitive. In their American study, medical 
information and location data -- that have been previously studied to be very sensitive62  -- are 
evaluated to be not as sensitive as, e.g., financial data.  
But what causes users to perceive certain information types as more sensitive than others? 
The perception of sensitivity is related to the perceived risks when disclosing such information 
and, thus, related to the vulnerability and potential losses that are anticipated.63 Users are concerned 
about unauthorized use, misuse (e.g., fraud, identity theft, hackers), and improper access.64 But they 
also feel that the collection of information itself, targeted advertising, and profiling are violations of 
their privacy.65 Thus, they seem not to differentiate between data privacy and data security. Empirical 
research also shows that more personally identifying information is perceived as more sensitive,66 
which goes in line with the GDPR covering personally identifying information. As we discussed in 
Section II. Information Sensitivity from a Technological Perspective, improving data analysis 
technologies enable ever-deeper insights about users. Most users may not be aware about what is 
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legally and technically possible and how presumably non-identifiable or insensitive data can be linked 
and used.67 
Besides limited knowledge about IT and law there is another aspect, that complicates the 
sensitivity evaluation for the users: Privacy perceptions, desires, and perceived privacy risks depend 
on context and audience.68 In a medical consultation, we may disclose medical information to a 
stranger (the physician) without worries, which we would not share with good friends. We learn from 
early childhood on, how to manage our privacy in an offline world, e.g., by closing doors and holding 
conversations in inaudible distance from unwanted listeners. But online, data is persistently available 
over space and time, confusing the context in which we disclose information and those, in which it 
can be accessed and by whom.69 With the collapsing contexts of data disclosure in the online world 
due to the persistence and replicability of data,70 users do not only have to include the present 
audience and context to evaluate the risk of disclosure and sensitivity of information but also potential 
access of information in the future by different entities and in different contexts. And the 
technological possibilities to combine data across services also need to be considered. At this point 
the question arises, whether the implicit risk evaluation users apply to determine their perception of 
sensitivity of information coincides with what is legal and what is technically possible. 
1. The Empirical Approach 
To provide a European user perspective on sensitivity of information, we conducted an empirical 
study in which n = 601 German internet users evaluated 40 data types regarding their felt sensitivity 
in an online questionnaire. The perceived sensitivity is assessed without contextual frame, as in the 
online world, contexts, audiences, and time frames melt together. Thus, such context-free perceptions 
of sensitivity mirror assessments users need to make in the digital world. 
The online questionnaire started with a short introduction to the topic and demographic questions 
(age, gender, education level). In the main part, the participants evaluated 40 information types on a 
6-point scale from “not sensitive at all`` (1) to “very sensitive`` (6). 32 information types were taken 
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from the study of Markos et al.71  for comparability. Eight ones were chosen as they have been 
controversially discussed by participants of a preceding focus group study. To prevent sequence 
effects, the order of data types was randomized for each participant. The data types are listed in Figure 
1. 
2. The Sample 
601 participants between 15 and 69 years of age completed the online questionnaire (M = 38.8, 
SD = 20.23). 59.1% were women. The questionnaire was distributed online via an independent market 
research company. The education level is also quite heterogeneously distributed (cf. Table 1) showing 
a good cross-section of German internet users. 
Table 1. Demographic characteristics of the sample, n = 601. 
  distribution in sample  
(n = 601) 
age [years] mean (SD) 38.8 (20.23) 
 min – max  15 - 69 
gender women 59.1% 
 men 40.9% 
education no certificate 7.2% 
 certificate of secondary education 26.3% 
 apprenticeship 19.3% 
 qualification for university entrance 26.1% 
 university degree 21.1% 
3. Users Evaluation of Data Sensitivity 
The perceived sensitivity for all 40 data types is depicted in Figure 1. On average, passwords are felt 
to be the most sensitive information type out of the presented ones (M = 5.57, SD = 0.94), followed 
by financial account numbers (M = 5.55, SD = 0.975). Both are evaluated as “very sensitive” on average 
with the mean higher than 5.5. Data types that are perceived to be “sensitive” (4.5 < M < 5.5) range 
from personal identifiers like passport number (M = 4.99, SD = 1.33) and fingerprint (M = 4.94, SD = 
1.45) to GPS location (M = 4.63, SD = 1.34), home address (M = 4.61, SD = 1.47), and medical history 
(M = 4.6, SD = 1.37). Users perceive as “rather sensitive” (3.5 < M < 4.5) for example the following: 
online activities like browsing history (M = 4.33, SD = 1.35), law enforcement files (M = 4.39, SD = 1.71), 
medication (M = 4.04, SD = 1.54), sexual preferences (M = 3.84, SD = 1.77), and license plate number 
(M = 3.64, SD = 1.58). “Rather not sensitive” are, for example, political affiliation (M = 3.38, SD = 1.45), 
weight (M = 3.26, SD = 1.53), zip code (M = 3.13, SD = 1.45), occupation (M = 2.85, SD = 1.37), and 
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height (M = 2.51, SD = 1.29). The only two information types from this list that are perceived as “not 
sensitive” (1.5 < M < 2.5) are hair color (M = 2.19, SD = 1.33) and name of pet (M = 2.09, SD = 1.31). 
None is on average felt to be “not sensitive at all” (M < 1.5). 
 Figure 1. Users' evaluation of the sensitivity of 40 data types (n = 601) categorized into the legal classification. 
V. Comparison between Legal, Technical, and User Perspective on 
Information Sensitivity & Discussion 
After presenting the technological, legal, and user perspective on information sensitivity 
separately, we will in this chapter compare the three perspectives and discuss the differences and 
similarities. Figure 1 depicts the legal and user perspective on sensitivity. It shows that users' 
perception of sensitivity is for some data types in line with the legal categorization, but also deviates 
strongly for other data types. The data types that are perceived as most sensitive by the users 
(passwords, financial account numbers) are legally classified as possibly special category and no 
special category. This assessment by the users indicates that they do not differentiate between data 
privacy and data security. Rather, the sensitivity evaluation is based on a risk assessment, and users 
are concerned about unauthorized access and illicit data misuse as well as about data collection, 
targeted advertising, and profiling (cf. Section IV. Information Sensitivity from a User Perspective). The 
legal use of personal data, however, under Art. 32 GDPR always requires adequate data security 
measures proportional to the risks of data processing (cf. Section III. Information Sensitivity from a 
Legal Perspective). Hence, service operators implement established technical protection measures, 
e.g., by especially protecting user passwords that need to be stored on their facilities. However, as we 
discussed in Section II. Information Sensitivity from a Technological Perspective, even despite huge 
efforts to technically protect such user data, we experience frequent data breaches, as is documented 
by the service portal ``Have I Been Pwned?''.72 
Data protection, however, starts earlier and already tries to minimize the occasions and purposes 
in which personal data is collected and processed. While the users’ estimation of the data sensitivity 
might anticipate the uncontrolled release and accept the necessity of the processing in other contexts, 
the data protection law works with wider categories and has internalized the dependence of the 
context. Hence, from a legal point of view the additional protection of special categories of personal 
data aims at categories whose general acquaintance, irrespective of its legality, might bear severe 
risks and consequences. Therefore, the legislator even restricted the contexts of legal uses compared 
to regular personal data.  
Political affiliation and religion are classified as special category and thus, particularly deserving 
protection by the GDPR, but are assessed as `rather not sensitive' on average by the participants of 
the survey. The German view on data protection is, among other factors, highly influenced by the 
country’s historical experience of two dictatorships cementing their power through surveillance and 
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control of the citizens and the potential as well as the risks of modern electronic data processing.73 
This influenced the development of the European data protection law.74 As illustrated in Section III. 
Information Sensitivity from a Legal Perspective, the legal point of view on special categories of 
personal data, as the most sensitive pieces of information in data protection law, mainly concern 
issues that can be used as leverage points for discrimination, such as religious believes, political 
opinions, or sexual orientation, and are closely connected to the exercise of fundamental rights, e.g., 
union memberships. Therefore, they need the particular protection of the democratic society and its 
laws. This aspect does not have the same importance for common users and the deviation between 
law and user evaluation can be explained by the methodological approach to report the mean user 
evaluation. For many users who have a mainstream political attitude or a religion that is not 
discriminated, these information types may not seem sensitive. The minority of those users who may 
be discriminated for these characteristics do not have much weight within the average evaluation, but 
still need to be protected from discrimination. Similarly, sexual preferences are probably more than 
“rather sensitive” for some but not all internet users. As mentioned above short-term financial losses 
and other acute consequences of released data are more relevant in the users' world of experience, 
while the legislator has to consider long-term implications for the individual and the democratic 
society as a whole.  
In Section 2. Increasing Data Sensitivity, we have seen that the voluntary sharing of personal 
information in social media can make users vulnerable and create possibilities for harm, as showcased 
by the potential information leakage due to meta data or advanced analyses such as performed by 
Cambridge Analytica. Users see these risks to some extend and state that they are concerned, but still 
disclose this information.75 One explanation for this privacy paradoxical user behavior is given by the 
theory of the privacy calculus,76 which assumes that users weigh perceived benefits and perceived 
privacy risks against each other. Thus, they disclose information when the benefits outweigh the risks. 
Correspondingly, the evaluation of risks is only one side of the coin. Self-disclosure on social network 
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sites bring many benefits to the individual including self-representation, relationship development, 
and social control.77 These may outweigh the perceived concerns.  
Additionally, research has shown that users do not make a purely rational decision. Rather, 
decision making is affected by cognitive biases and heuristics.78 For example, optimism bias lead 
individuals to the perception that they themselves are less vulnerable than others 79  and affect 
heuristics influences the risk assessment in a way that users tend to underestimate risks and 
correspondingly disclose more, when it is associated with things they like.80  These psychological 
means will always influence users' decision making to some extent.   
Here, the aim of data legislation and privacy preserving technologies should be to guarantee users 
an online environment in which they can freely decide what to share, in line with the principle of 
informational self-determination. This also includes data protection via technical and legal means, so 
that users are protected to the largest extent possible. This is particularly important as the online 
context is marked by persistence of information, making it harder for users to delete once published 
data.  
Another deviation between users' and legal evaluation is the categorization of location 
information. GPS data can either comprise distinct locations or even whole trajectories as discussed 
in Section 2. Increasing Data Sensitivity and is felt to be sensitive by users. But location is not part of 
the group of special categories of data under Art. 9 GDPR. Nevertheless, there is European legislation 
providing special rules for its processing. Directive 2002/58/EC, which was enacted to complement 
the former European Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, defines it as any data processed in an 
electronic communications network, indicating the geographic position of the terminal equipment of 
a user of a publicly available electronic communication service. (Art. 2 lit. c) dir. 2002/58/EC) Art. 9 
sec. 1 dir. 2002/58/EC allows the processing of this data only after its anonymization or with the 
consent of the users to the extent and for the duration necessary to provide an additional service. The 
scope of this provision, however, is limited to the regulation of data processing in the context of 
providing publicly available electronic communications networks (cf. Art. 3 sec. 1 dir. 2002/58/EC), 
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e.g., by phone companies or closed user groups.81 For every other purpose and processing the rules 
of the GDPR apply subsidiarily, treating location data connected to person as regular personal data. 
Hence, only in a very limited number of use cases relevant today a further protection of location data 
is granted by law.  
Considering the possibility of creating movement profiles of users through the analysis of location 
data and the threats to a person's freedom and rights such profiles bear, the protection granted by 
law seems insufficient. One reason for this situation is the ongoing reform process of the European 
data protection law. The directive 2002/58/EC relevant at hand will be renewed and transferred into 
a regulation in the near future (cf. Proposal for as Regulation concerning the respect for private life 
and the protection of personal data in electronic communications and repealing Directive 
2002/58/EG, COM 2017/010final-2017/03(COD)). Hence, the current legal state does not, yet, meet 
today's technical challenges. Despite of the oncoming reform, the classification of location data as 
common personal data within the GDPR should be reconsidered and a higher level of protection for 
location data should be created.  
The contrast between the European law and examples like the “Chinese Social Credit System”82 
shows that, in other cases, due to sufficient legal regulations in Europe, users are protected from 
harmful aggregation of data, although this would be technically possible. The collection of license 
plate numbers to create a governmental “obedience score” is not conceivable, as the European 
fundamental rights exclude, e.g., the comprehensive assessment of a person's behavior and actions. 
Therefore, European users do not need to be concerned about possible consequences which could 
result from the collection of such data. The low sensitivity evaluation of license plate number by the 
German sample shows that users indeed do not see many risks connected to that information. This 
indicates that either they rely on the law to protect them or that they are not aware of the 
technological possibilities to use this type of information (against them).  
The latter assumption -- users not being aware of potential risks -- is important to consider 
regarding users' perception of privacy risks in general. Looking at data disclosure decisions through a 
privacy calculus lens, users need to evaluate the risks of data disclosure. To do that sufficiently, they 
need to be aware of these risks. However, they are not always privy to the legal protection and 
technical means.83 
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The authors argue that the main objective should not be informational heteronomy that is 
imposed by law over the users but informational self-determination. But this requires that users are 
aware and able to evaluate the risks of data disclosures. As we see, users are in fact not knowledgeable 
about the legal protection and the technical possibilities to use and combine data, this awareness is 
oftentimes missing. To empower users here, they need to be well informed. But educational measures 
at school are limited, especially because of the ever-evolving technical means. Thus, education and 
information must be available from a trusted source for all citizens, e.g., from a governmental website. 
Also, qualified media coverage and easy to understand consent forms are required. Finally, 
technological means to prevent unauthorized access to user data or the derivation of additional 
information from such data need to be further improved, especially given the increasing complexity 
of how such data is being processed. 
In summary, the comparison of the different perspectives on data sensitivity shows that users', 
technical, and legal views deviate to some degree. For example, the law grants protection to data 
categories as “special” categories that not all users perceive as especially sensitive. This can be seen 
as unproblematic as users are still able to freely disclose data, thereby giving their explicit consent to 
process this data. Other data categories, e.g., GPS data, are not given special privacy protection by the 
GDPR, but they are perceived as sensitive by the users and are, from a technological perspective, very 
revealing about the individual user. Here, the law nevertheless requires adequate data security 
measures for data processing, thus still providing protection. Rather, it is a problem that users, by 
allowing the processing of their data on the basis of consent without being fully aware of possible 
consequences, often thwart the safeguards of data protection laws which generally tries to limit the 
amount of processed data and the admissible purposes of its processing. For the premise of 
informational self-determination, it is of utmost importance to raise users' awareness about possible 
risks of data disclosure, on the one hand, and the legal protection they are entitled to, on the other 
hand. As long as the users decide to give their free, specific, informed, and unambiguous consent to 
the processing of their data as demanded by Artt. 7 sec. 1, 4 No. 11 GDPR the processing is in 
accordance with the law. It is, therefore, a manifestation of the user's informational self determination 
which would, otherwise, turn into informational heteronomy. Finally, technological means must seek 
to unburden the users, i.e., provide the best data protection possible while not overly restricting the 
users' freedom of educated self-expression. From a legal point of view, the different perception of 
data sensitivity by users, computer science, and law seems unproblematic. It would be an issue if the 
legal framework could not provide the data protection and security users are legitimately expecting 
or if the law would ignore threats to privacy uncovered by technical sciences. In the current state, 
admittedly, the perception of the importance between the three perspectives differs. However, the 
categories of data seen as sensitive by users and science are adequately protected by law, although it 
grants other categories, which are not rated as particularly sensitive by users or computer science, 
more protection for the aforementioned reasons. 
